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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of critical 
importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum to accomplish a 
variety of objectives, such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular piece of 
acquisition research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or reasoning, (3) 
put down one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) present a preliminary 
draft of an eventual article in an acquisition periodical, (5) provide a tutorial (such as a 
technical note) to accompany a case study, and (6) develop a dialogue among 
practitioners and researchers that encourages debate and discussion on topics of 
mutual importance.   A working paper is generally the “internal” outlet for academic and 
research institutions to cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, particularly when in its 
infant stages.  The primary intent is to induce critical thinking about crucial acquisition 
issues/problems that will become part of the acquisition professional body of 
knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be published 
in other venues, such as in refereed journals and other periodicals, as technical reports, 
as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, or as a variety of other 
similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working- 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will be 
challenged, examined and articulated.
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Abstract 
The purpose of this working paper is to highlight the challenges and associated 
risks Federal contracting officers face while conducting business under commercially-
based contracting legislation and, with concurrent reductions in the acquisition 
workforce, the potential risks these changes place on the taxpayer.   
It is the researcher’s contention that the past decade-long wave of acquisition 
work-force reductions and commercially-inspired acquisition reforms has created a 
responsive and progressive business environment. Yet, it has done so at the cost of the 
Federal government becoming less “engaged.” In fact, the government has become 
“disengaged” in key oversight and management functions.  This disengagement may be 
exposing Federal contracting officers and taxpayers to greater financial, programmatic 
and performance risks.  The working paper will highlight recent legislation and its impact 
on determining “fair and reasonable pricing” for “commercial item” acquisitions and 
highlight workforce changes which negatively impact regulatory oversight and 
management capability, and will make specific recommendations for improving 
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Acquisition reform initiatives, commercialization of business processes, and a 
decade-long streamlining of the Acquisition Workforce have all been aimed at 
fundamentally improving the business of acquiring goods and services for Federal 
Agencies, including the Department of Defense.   
The National Performance Review kicked-off the current era’s wave of reforms, 
initially commencing in 1993.  Initial efforts at reform gained significant momentum 
during the Clinton presidency and, more recently, with influential reformers such as Dr. 
Jacques S. Gansler, former Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L) and with Representative 
Tom Davis (R-VA) Virginia, who chairs and leads the Committee on Government 
Reform.   
The impetus for reforms and streamlining the acquisition workforce stems as 
much from a move towards greater efficiency as from the reality of adapting business 
practices to meet an ever-shrinking acquisition workforce; likewise, changes have been 
catalyzed by a concurrent effort to encourage innovative companies which traditionally 
have not conducted business with the Federal Government to enter into contracts for 
goods and services with Federal Agencies. 
Amidst all of the reforms and structural changes has been a shift in the nature, or 
make-up, of what the Federal government procures—from predominantly tangible 
goods and hardware to a near fifty-fifty mix of goods and services.    
Recent legislative initiatives have created substantive changes in the business 
processes that Federal contracting officers have at their disposal.  The Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA1), the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA2) and 
                                            
1 Act may be cited as the “Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994”. 
2 Act may be cited as the “Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995”. 
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the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA3) have all moved the Federal acquisition 
policies and procedures closer to commercial-industry standard.    
However, the concurrent down-sizing of the acquisition workforce, combined with 
the move towards commercial-style business processes under recent legislation, have 
increased the business risks facing Federal contracting officers and, ultimately, the 
taxpayers.   
This paper explores the concepts of engagement and disengagement related to 
recent acquisition workforce structural changes and concurrent legislation aimed at 
commercializing Federal acquisition business practices. 
Engagement and Disengagement Concept Definitions. 
The concepts of ‘engagement’ and ‘disengagement’ are derived from their 
definitions found within the Oxford English Dictionary4.   Engagement, for the purposes 
of this paper, is broadly defined as to be bound by or committed to a cause, to involve 
or commit to, to mesh with.   Within this context, the researcher defines ‘engagement’ 
as the means, capability and willingness of the Federal government to monitor and 
oversee the actions of contractors and subcontractors in promise of, or in actual receipt 
of Federal tax dollars under federally-awarded contracts.  Conversely, the term 
‘disengagement’ means the inability or unwillingness of the Federal Government to 
monitor and oversee the actions of contractors and subcontractors in promise of, or in 
actual receipt of Federal tax dollars under federally-awarded contracts.   
Purpose of this Working Paper. 
The purpose of this working paper is to highlight the challenges and associated 
risks that Federal contracting officers face while conducting business under 
commercially-based contracting legislation and with concurrent reductions in the 
acquisition workforce, and the potential risks that these changes place on the taxpayer.   
                                            
3 Act may be cited as the “Service Acquisition Reform Act of 2003”. 
4 The Oxford English Dictionary (unabridged), Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 3- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
It is the researcher’s contention that the past decade-long wave of acquisition 
workforce reductions and commercially-inspired acquisition reforms has created a 
responsive and progressive business environment. Yet, it has done so at the cost of the 
Federal government becoming less “engaged.” In fact, the government has 
“disengaged” in key oversight and management functions.  This disengagement may be 
exposing Federal contracting officers and taxpayers to greater financial, programmatic 
and performance risks.  The working paper will highlight recent legislation and its impact 
on determining “fair and reasonable pricing” for “commercial item” acquisitions, illustrate 
workforce changes which negatively impact regulatory oversight and management 
compliance, and will make specific recommendations for improving performance and 
reducing risks in Federal acquisition and contract management. 
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The Push for Greater Efficiency and Effectiveness 
The fall of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 prompted senior U.S. 
Government leaders to push for a “peace dividend.”  Without our forty-year-old cold war 
foe, the Government could, it was believed, apply much of the money previously spent 
on the military to better domestic use.  The National Performance Review (NPR), 
commencing in 1993 (only shortly after the cold war’s demise), really marks the start of 
an over-a-decade-long push towards greater efficiency and effectiveness of 
Government operations.  The NPR, in essence, created the ideal of having a 
Government responsive to all its stakeholders, and its popularity was embraced by the 
executive branch and legislators alike. 
Without a major foe, the military and its supporting personnel structures were 
targeted by the legislature and executive branch and experienced dramatic reductions.  
The acquisition community was not spared in this call for restructuring.   According to 
the General Accounting Office, within the past decade the DoD downsized the civilian 
acquisition workforce by nearly 50%: from nearly 250,000 employees to less than 
124,000.5 
Several notable and respected academics, also during the past decade, 
proposed acquisition reform measures with the intent to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of the acquisition process, and to gain those same efficiencies which 
would enable the DoD acquisition workforce to do more with less.  Among notable 
scholars and influential works are:  “Remaking Federal Procurement” by Steven 
Kelman; from Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, former Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L) now 
Vice-President for Research at the University of Maryland, “Moving Toward Market-
Based Government...,” 6 “Commercial Pricing,”7 and “A vision of the Government as a 
                                            
5 GAO-02-630: Acquisition Workforce; Department of Defense Plans to Address Workforce Size and 
Structure Challenges, April 2002. 
6 Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of 
Government, University of Maryland, June 2003. 
7 “Commercial Pricing” National Contract Management Association, 1998. 
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World-Class Buyer: Major Procurement Issues for the Coming Decade.”8   Without 
reservation, this researcher asserts these authors and visionaries have influenced 
modern thinking in acquisition reform. 
Additionally, legislators such as Congressman Tom Davis, representing Virginia’s 
11th District and Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform, have 
embraced and initiated—through legislative means—reformation of the acquisition 
process, including the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, the 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995, and the Service Acquisition Reform Act of 
2003.  All of the Acts (FASA, FARA, and SARA) created “commercial” buying practices 
aimed at garnering greater efficiency and effectiveness in the acquisition process, and 
eliciting greater participation in Federal acquisitions by non-traditional contractors.   
Notwithstanding all of the legislative changes mandated by the aforementioned, 
Congressman Davis is, at the date of this working paper, sponsoring a bill known as the 
Acquisition System Improvement Act (ASIA), co-sponsored by Representative Duncan 
Hunter of California.9  Yet, despite the manifold benefits attained by adopting 
commercial buying practices, the specific results of legislation and its implementation is 
not without strong critics.  Two noteworthy challengers are Steven L Schooner, 
Associate Professor of Law at George Washington University School of Law, whose 
critique was published in an article entitled, “Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental 
Failure of Businesslike Government,”10 and Danielle Brian, Executive Director of the 
Project on Government Oversight (POGO11).  
Criticism of the legislated reforms can be summarized as follows: the legislative 
reforms decrease critical managerial and oversight responsibilities traditionally afforded 
                                            
8 Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, A Vision of the Government as a World-Class Buyer: Major Procurement Issues 
for the Coming Decade, University of Maryland, January 2002. 
9 H.R. 4228 of the 108th Congress.  Latest Major Action: 5/5/2004 House committee/subcommittee 
actions. Status: Executive Comment Requested from DOD. 
10 Steven L. Schooner, Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University of Law, George 
Washington University Press, July 23rd, 2001.   
11 Project on Government Oversight (POGO) is a non-profit organization, at www.pogo.org.  
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the Federal contracting officer, thus exposing the contracting officer and the taxpayer to 
significant risks.    
Moving Towards Commercialization: FASA and FARA 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 represented the beginning of 
the legislative acquisition reforms aimed at commercialization.   
Among one of its many major provisions was the concept of “commercial item” 
acquisition.  Prior to FASA, Federal acquisitions, according to rigid criteria, were subject 
to myriad laws and regulations—compliance with which was mandatory for contractors 
participating in Federal procurements.12  The plethora of regulatory requirements 
mandated by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), along with the implementation 
guidance under the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR) and specific 
agency mandates and regulations, created a “choke hold” on contractors doing 
business with the Federal Government; these regulations acted as a solid barrier-of-
entry for potential non-traditional commercial businesses that could offer much-needed 
commercial goods and services to the Federal government.   Due to the overwhelming 
legislative and regulatory burden contractors faced when doing business with the 
Federal government, many potential contractors refused to conduct business in the 
Federal arena.   Recognizing the dilemma emerging from traditional regulatory-based 
and constrictive business practices (and the impact these were having on potential and 
actual participants with the Federal government), the Department of Defense (DoD) 
contracted a study with the management consulting firm of Coopers and Lybrand to 
study the impact of DoD’s acquisition regulations and oversight requirements on its 
contractors.   
                                            
12 Author commentary:  The range and scope of laws applicable to a specific contract action was, and 
continues to be, based on acquisition methodology, type of contract vehicle, and the monetary amount of 
the acquisition.   
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In December 1994, Coopers and Lybrand issued its report, which identified over 
120 regulatory and statutory cost drivers that, according to the study, increased the 
price DoD paid for goods and services by eighteen percent.13  As an example, 
contractor compliance with the provisions of the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) 
resulted in a 1.3% premium paid by the Government.14  The table in Appendix A, 
sourced from the cited GAO Report, highlights the top ten of over 120 cost drivers which 
were identified by corporations participating in the study. 15   
Yet, even while the Federal government was experiencing a major downsizing 
and restructuring, it was inescapably reliant on the commercial marketplace for goods 
and services that were once provided by ‘organic’ sources within the Federal (and DoD) 
structure.   
With the prompting of several industry groups, including the Aerospace Industries 
Association, Federal lawmakers moved quickly to implement the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA 1994). This legislation created a preference for “commercial 
item acquisitions.”  FASA eliminated many of the statutory and regulatory requirements 
for “commercial” items.  The concept behind commercial item designation is that the 
Federal government could structure its buying processes to approximate what industry 
utilizes in its business-to-business transactions.  Specifically, priced-based acquisition, 
little–to-no audit requirements, and less-intrusive data collection (if any), would be 
applicable for all commercial item buys.  By statutory definition under FASA, commercial 
items were defined as items that were sold, leased or licensed to the general public.   
                                            
13 The DOD Regulatory Cost Premium: A Quantitative Assessment, Coopers and Lybrand, December 
1994.  
14 The Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) is applicable to all negotiated sole source contracts in excess of 
$550,000 and requires certified cost or pricing data, certified by an officer of the firm, as to current, 
accurate, and complete information as of the date of agreement on price.  TINA allows the Government to 
hold contractors financially and potentially criminally liable for “defective pricing” if the Government 
materially based its acceptance and award on the cost and pricing data provided by the contractor. 
15 GAO/NSIAD-96-106: Acquisition Reform; Efforts to Reduce the Cost to Manage and Oversee DOD 
Contracts.  GAO, April 1996. 
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Under this definition, a clear and demonstrable sales track-record to the general public 
could be used as the basis for Government contracting officers to make their FAR- 
mandated determination of “fair and reasonable” price pursuant to, and as a condition 
of, contract award.16   
What is noteworthy is that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12, 
“Acquisition of Commercial Items,” was created to comply with the new commercial-
based legislation, and effectively relieves contractors of many of the myriad laws and 
regulations to which they might otherwise be subject.  (See Appendix B for FAR 
excerpt). 
With industry lauding the FASA 1994 legislation, lawmakers quickly capitalized 
on the well-received commercial-item provisions.  One year after the passage of FASA, 
new legislation was proposed which, in addition to numerous other provisions, 
expanded the definition of “commercial item” to allow for even greater participation in 
Federal acquisitions from non-traditional firms; likewise, these provisions further 
reduced the burden of complex and costly statutory requirements originally identified by 
the Coopers and Lybrand study.  The new legislation, the Federal Acquisition Reform 
Act of 1995, expanded the definition of “commercial item” to include not only items that 
were sold, leased, or licensed to the general public, but any items that were offered for 
sale, lease, or license to the general public.  Additionally, the definition broadens to 
consist of items which have evolved from commercial items; this change will now 
include commercial items modified for Government use, commercial items and services 
combined for the Government requirement, non-developmental items, and services at 
catalog or market price.   
 
                                            
16 FAR Part 12: While the contracting officer must establish price reasonableness in accordance with 
13.106-3, 14.408-2, or Subpart 15.4, as applicable, the contracting officer should be aware of customary 
commercial terms and conditions when pricing commercial items. Commercial item prices are affected by 
factors that include, but are not limited to, speed of delivery, length and extent of warranty, limitations of 
seller's liability, quantities ordered, length of the performance period, and specific performance 
requirements. The contracting officer must ensure that contract terms, conditions, and prices are 
commensurate with the Government's need. 
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Table 1. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA 1994) Highlights  
Created preference for “commercial item” acquisition. 
Provided for utilization of “less intrusive” data sources in determining “fair and 
reasonable” pursuant to contract award; eliminated TINA requirements. 
Created a “broad” definition of “commercial item” to allow for maximum 
applicability of the legislative and regulatory relief under the provision. 
Created “best practice” business processes similar to commercial business-to-
business standards. 
Maximized reliance on industry and market forces to establish “fair and 
reasonable” pricing. 
Source: table by Elliott C. Yoder. 
Specific provisions of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA 1995) allowed 
for the utilization of Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) for commercial item goods 
and services up to and including $5 million dollars.  Other highlights of FARA are 
provided in Table 2 below 
Table 2. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FARA 1995) Highlights 
Expanded definition of “commercial item” and its applicability to include: 
• items which have evolved from commercial items 
• items that are commercial with modifications to meet Government unique 
requirements 
• combinations of commercial items and services for Government use 
• non-developmental items (NDI – items originally developed and/or sourced by 
a Government agency) 
• services at catalog or market prices 
Prohibited the use of certified cost and pricing data under TINA for commercial 
items. 
Allows the utilization of Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) up to $5 million 
for commercial goods and services. 
Source: table by Elliott C. Yoder. 
The “one-two” punch of FASA and FARA dramatically changed the business 
process operations of acquisitions for those items falling within the definition of 
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“commercial item.”   Over 100 statutes and regulations are no longer applicable for 
commercial item buys, including TINA.    
Disengagement Emanating from FARA and FASA—Commercial 
Item Designation and Its Inherently Unique Challenges and Risks. 
Disengagement, wherein the Government takes a less-active, less-intrusive 
approach to business, as defined earlier, results directly from FARA and FASA 
legislation and other provisions akin to these acts.17 
As stated previously, the contracting officer is required by regulation to make a 
determination prior to contract award that the price is “fair and reasonable.”18  The most 
preferred method to determine fair and reasonable pricing is through competition.   The 
Federal Acquisition Regulation prescribes favored techniques for making fair and 
reasonable determinations, listed in order of precedence (FAR 15.401): 
1.  Price analysis is the process of examining and evaluating a proposed price without 
evaluating its separate cost elements and proposed profit.  
2.  The Government may use various price analysis techniques and procedures to 
ensure a fair and reasonable price. Examples of such techniques include, but are 
not limited to, the following:  
i. Comparison of proposed prices received in response to the solicitation. 
Normally, adequate price competition establishes price reasonableness (see 
15.403-1(c)(1)).  
ii. Comparison of previously-proposed prices, previous Government- and 
commercial-contract prices with current proposed prices for the same or 
similar items, if both the validity of the comparison and the reasonableness of 
the previous price(s) can be established.  
                                            
17 Author’s note:  Disengagement and the push towards commercialization does not just stem from FASA 
and FARA legislation, but from other recent legislation including SARA and ASIA.  SARA and ASIA are 
not specifically addressed herein, but perpetuate and expand the Government’s disengagement. 
Additionally, structural changes in the form of acquisition workforce reductions at DCAA and DCMA also 
contribute to disengagement, and are specifically addressed in later sections of this working paper. 
18 FAR 15.400 series. 
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iii. Use of parametric estimating methods/application of rough yardsticks (such 
as dollars per pound or per horsepower, or other units) to highlight significant 
inconsistencies that warrant additional pricing inquiry.  
iv. Comparison with competitive published price lists, published market prices of 
commodities, similar indexes, and discount or rebate arrangements.  
v. Comparison of proposed prices with independent Government cost estimates.  
vi. Comparison of proposed prices with prices obtained through market research 
for the same or similar items.  
vii. Analysis of pricing information provided by the offerer.  
Commercial item designation under FARA and FASA, has one primary function 
or ideal.   The basic idea behind commercial-item acquisition is to capitalize on 
competitive market forces to establish fair and reasonable pricing.19    
The Federal government is charged with maximizing the value of taxpayer 
dollars.  In order to maximize value, the Government generally seeks to award its 
contracts through competition.  However, the Government does not always buy truly 
commercial items that are sold in substantial quantities to the general public.  Instead, 
and quite often, the Government buys unique products and services to which there is no 
direct commercially-available counterpart.  The competitive market in which the Federal 
government acquires its goods and services is diverse: from purely competitive and 
‘commercial’ competitors to oligopolistic or monopolistic contractors which match 





                                            
19 Adequate competition, for these purposes, means, that first, two or more participants contend 
independently for the Government requirement, or that one contender believes there is more than one 
participant vying for the award.   
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Source:  E. C. Yoder 
In fact, most of the procurement dollars in fiscal year 2003 expended on 
contracts above the simplified acquisition procedure threshold, reported on DD350 
reports (mandatory reports on contract actions), went to contractors that, generally 
speaking, did not offer bona-fide “commercial” goods or services.   Of the nearly $209 
billion dollars expended in 2003, fully $134 billion, representing 64.04 percent of the 
awarded contract dollars, went to the top 100 defense contractors (as defined by the 
monetary amount of DoD contract dollars awarded).  And, the top ten defense 
contractors received $83 billion, representing 39.72 percent, of the total dollars 




                                            
20 Figures and information derived from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), 2003 data.  As of 
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The top ten firms from 2003 are provided in Table 3 below. 
Table 3. Top Ten Companies by DOD Contract Award Dollars 
Company Name Dollars Total 2003 Percent of Total 
Lockheed Martin  $21,927,183,277. 10.49% 
Boeing $17,339,688,858. 8.30% 
Northrop Grumman $11,125,799,243. 5.32% 
General Dynamics $8,235,492,902. 3.94% 
Raytheon $7,915,749,339. 3.79% 
United Technologies $4,547,824,394. 2.18% 
Halliburton  $3,920,876,767. 1.88% 
General Electric  $2,842,131,348. 1.36% 
Science Applications $2,615,868,549. 1.25% 
Computer Sciences $2,530,846,723. 1.21% 
Top Ten Summary ≈ $81,808,000,000. 39.72% 
Source:  E. C. Yoder 
The majority of dollars being awarded by DoD goes to “traditional” defense 
contractors.  The dollars awarded to these firms were nearly evenly split between 
supplies (goods) and services; approximately 55% of the awards were spent on goods, 
and 45% on services.  These firms, for a majority of the products and services they 
offer, operate in quasi-competitive environments. Such arenas are characterized as 
oligopolistic or monopolistic markets. 
Federal Procurement Data System statistics for the first half of fiscal year 2004 
indicate that of 3,171,745 total contract actions reported from DoD, fully 2,782,693 
contract actions (or 87.73%) were reported on DD1057s for procurements under the 
Simplified Acquisition Procedure (SAP) threshold, (the DD1057 reports all actions under 
the Simplified Acquisition Threshold).  Clearly, these actions are the best candidates for 
application of “true competition” under commercial-item designation.  Yet, surprisingly, 
nearly one-half of all those SAP actions were either not available for competition as a 
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follow-on action, or were simply not competed.21  To reiterate, the commercial item 
definition under FASA and FARA is very broad in its application and interpretation.  
Thus, contractors have broad leeway to assert their product or service is “commercial.”  
This creates a unique challenge for Federal contracting officers buying goods and 
services that are, in essence, unique to the Government and perhaps never sold in any 
quantity (or are in very limited quantities) to the general public.  Thus, the contracting 
officer often finds no true competition for the product or service he/she seeks, finds that 
there is no commercial sales history of such products, and finds—to confuse matters 
more completely—that the offering business/contractor is asserting that its product or 
service is commercial and, therefore, subject to the provisions of FASA and FARA.  This 
makes such acquisitions very challenging and risky for the contracting officer, and 
ultimately the taxpayer, especially when making the mandated determination of ‘fair and 
reasonable’. 
This presents the following dilemma: firms may claim, under the definition of 
commercial item per FASA and FARA, that any item offered for sale to the general 
public qualifies as a commercial item, and is, therefore, exempt from dozens of statutes, 
including the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) requiring certified cost and pricing for all 
negotiated contracts in excess of $550,000.   Yet, despite business/contractor asserting 
“commercial item” designation, the Government is either not taking full advantage of 
competitive market forces to determine fair and reasonable price, or is unable to do so.  
One model clearly illustrates the competitive forces at work in the marketplace.  
However, competitive forces, according to Porter’s five force model, require sales and 
time to fully realize any equilibrium and stable pricing.22 
 
                                            
21 Derived from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), DOD Summary of Awards, October 2003 
through June 2004. 
22 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors, 1980. 
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Figure 3. The Five Competitive Forces 
 
Source: Michael Porter23 
Some agencies have made attempts to mitigate the negative effects of products 
and services which have only been offered for sale to the general public—but which 
have not actually sold—by requiring that firms sell at least one of the products in 
question to the general public prior to the Federal government award.  However, the 
researcher contends that this practice provides only the façade of true competition, as 
the effects of competitive sales and associated pricing equilibrium are not fully 
materialized with one sale, or a limited number of sales, in a short time period. 
Additionally, on those actions above the SAP threshold, DoD contracting officers 
currently rely on price-analysis techniques based on uncertain and uncertified data, 
including prior pricing histories for same or similar items bought in the past.  The 
Government Accounting Office and this researcher contend that the Government is at 
higher risk of paying inflated prices with these techniques than after obtaining certified 
cost and pricing data necessary under TINA.  GAO specifically warns that higher risks 
                                            
23 Ibid. 
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result from utilization of historical data, vice competitive forces, Governmental order 
changes, Governmental requirement modification, and contractor/corporation mergers 
and acquisitions which may affect the basis of the original estimates and proposals from 
prior acquisitions.  The practice of relying on aging data, even data that was previously 
certified, places significant risks on that data’s reliability of forming meaningful 
comparisons to current procurements.24   Yet, historical data is one of the higher-tier 
methodologies recommended when competition is not present and the use of certified 
cost and pricing data is not available, or not allowed, such as under commercial-item 
acquisitions.   Thus, a significant paradox exists in implementing sound business 
practices in determining “fair and reasonable.”   
The bottom line is that FASA and FARA commercial-item designation may work 
well for goods and services in a truly competitive marketplace, but it allows for potential 
over-pricing in limited- or quasi-competitive markets such as the monopolies and 
oligopolies in which the Federal Government spends most of its dollars.    
To compound the problem, the commercial-item legislation has created an 
environment of disengagement in that the Government may no longer have the tools 
required to shift the balance of pricing power in limited- or non-competitive acquisitions 
through the use of TINA provisions.   Thus, the Government may be subjected to paying 
far greater prices for products and services, and perhaps not even realize it is doing so. 
                                            
24 GAO-02-502: Contract Management: DOD Needs Better Guidance on Granting Waivers for Certified 
Cost or Pricing Data, General Accounting Officer, April 2002. 
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DOD Contract Audit and Management Workforce 
Dynamic  
Another prime example of the shift from engagement to disengagement is 
represented by the manpower reductions in two Department of Defense agencies: the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), and the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA).  
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) has a multi-purpose mission 
designed to protect the interests of the Department of Defense (and ultimately the 
taxpayer) through provision of audit services on defense procurements and contracts.   
DCAA provides a wide variety of products and services to contracting officers across 
the full spectrum of the contracting process.  Some of the more prominent functions are 
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Table 4. Defense Contract Audit Agency 
Primary Mission Functions 
Primary Mission Area Primary Mission Function 
Pre-award Contract Audit Services Price Proposal Support 
 Pre-Award Surveys 
 Forward Pricing Labor and Overhead 
Rate (Agreements and 
Recommendations) 
Post-award Contract Audit Services Incurred Costs/Annual Overhead Rates 
(establishing final billing rates) 
 Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) 
Compliance 
 CAS (Cost Accounting Standards) 
Compliance and Adequacy 
 Claims 
 Financial Capability Assessments 




 Electronic Data Processing 
 Compensation 
 Billing 
 Budgeting (and Estimating) 
 Material Management 
 Labor 
 Purchasing 
 Indirect and Other Cost Analysis 
Contract Negotiation Assistance Fact-Finding and Post-Action Analysis 
 Procurement Liaison Services 
Source: Data from DCAA web-site (www.DCAA.mil), layout by E. C. Yoder. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) specifically addresses contract audit 
functions and provides regulatory mandates in FAR Part 42.000 and 42.100.  However, 
the functions that DCAA performs may impact nearly all the FAR provisions, depending 
on the nature of the acquisition.  For example, specific post-award audits on Cost 
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Accounting Standards compliance encompass FAR Part 30—Cost Accounting 
Standards. 
According to DCAA statistics, in FY 2003, DCAA audited 9,829 pricing proposals 
(pre-award) with a total dollar value of $160.9 billion.  Additionally, audits of incurred 
costs and special audits (post-award) during that same period totaled $103.6 billion.  
Approximately $2.2 billion in net savings were reported during the year. When 
compared to the $405.0 million expended for the Agency's operations, the return on 
taxpayers' investment in DCAA was $5.50 for each dollar invested.25  
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) performs, as the name 
implies, contract management functions on defense acquisitions and contracts.   The 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is the Department of Defense (DoD) 
component that works directly with Defense suppliers to help ensure that DoD, Federal, 
and allied government supplies and services are delivered on time, at projected cost, 
and meet all performance requirements.  
DCMA professionals serve as "information brokers" and in-plant representatives 
for military, Federal, and allied government buying agencies—both during the initial 
stages of the acquisition cycle and throughout the life of the resulting contracts. 
• Before contract award, DCMA provides advice and services to help construct 
effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select the most capable contractors, 
and write contracts that meet the needs of our customers in DoD, Federal and allied 
government agencies.  
• After contract award, DCMA monitors contractors' performance and management 
systems to ensure that cost, product performance, and delivery schedules are in 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts.  
                                            
25 DCAA data from www.DCAA.mil.   
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DCMA is a recognized leader of, and contributor to many of the DoD's business 
reform initiatives. Those initiatives' goals are to improve the Nation's defense in the 
most economical and efficient ways possible26.    
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 42.200 defines the primary 
functions of DCMA applicable to contract management.   The list of functions is too 
great to imbed in its entirety in this discussion, but is provided in its completeness as 
Appendix C.  
The authority and the mandate to perform contract administration and 
management stems from legislation—namely 48 CFR Chapter 1.   Specifically, when a 
contract is assigned for administration under Subpart 42.2, the Contract Administration 
Office (CAO) shall perform contract administration functions in accordance with 48 CFR 
Chapter 1, the contract terms, and, unless otherwise agreed to in an interagency 
agreement (see 42.002), the applicable regulations of the servicing agency.27  
Manpower and Personnel (Structural Changes) Contribute to 
Disengagement and Increase Risks. 
Despite the functionality and service that DCAA and DCMA provide, in most 
cases mandated by statute or regulation, their workforces have been decimated by a 
decade’s worth of cuts.    
Currently, the Defense Contract Audit Agency has just over 4,000 personnel 
assigned, of which nearly 3,500 (over 85%) are auditors. The remaining 15% are 
assigned to administrative and clerical functions.  The DCAA workforce is well-educated 
and capable: over 1,200 of the 4,000 have CPAs, over 3,500 have college degrees, and 
797 have advanced degrees.28  
                                            
26 Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) mission statement except, from www.DCMA.mil. 
27 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 42. 
28 Data from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).  Personnel data from 2003.  Data from 2004 not 
available as of the date of this working paper. 
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The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) employs 10,868 civilians 
and 623 military assigned within three districts.  DCMA is currently managing 16,166 
contractors with 316,119 contracts with an obligated value of $918 billion.  Management 
functions specifically performed include all those listed in Appendix C, which may 
include management functions uniquely defined in individual contracts— for example, 
some of these may be distinct-quality assurance plans, earned-value management, 
performance-based payment monitoring, etc., to name a few.  Yet, DCMA Civilian 
staffing has taken a 54.6% reduction since 1990. 







Source:  DCMA Briefing by Lisa Hamptonstall 
The personnel strengths iterated above represent a fraction of the end-strength 
these organizations had a decade ago.  Concurrent with the push towards acquisition 
reform, these agencies were dramatically down-sized.  The general belief of academics 
and authors of acquisition reform is that with the advent of legislation which reshaped 
the business processes in Federal acquisitions, a concurrent reduction of 
“administrative” personnel should ensue.   For example, FASA and FARA—with their 
commercial-item designation provisions, which relieved many of the mandatory 
statutory and regulatory requirements applicable to contractors—were also believed to 
reduce the administrative burden on the Federal acquisition communities charged with 







# Civilians On Board 23,96 21,32 19,89 19,06 17,27 16,47 15,20 13,91 13,14 11,91 11,75 11,76 10,61 10,44 10,86
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There was no shortage of calls for personnel reductions, aimed at capitalizing on 
the new commercial business models.   Among some notable calls for reduction were 
the Coopers and Lybrand study29 and several GAO reports, including an April 1996 
report entitled, Acquisition Reform: Efforts to Reduce the Cost to Manage and Oversee 
DoD Contracts30 and a 1997 report entitled, Acquisition Reform: DoD Faces Challenges 
in Reducing Oversight Costs31 and a July 1998 report entitled, Acquisition Management: 
Workforce Reductions and Contractor Oversight.32 These publications called for greater 
efficiencies through risk-management techniques—techniques this researcher contends 
cause disengagement.  Specific recommendations of the July 1998 GAO report indicate 
specific risk management strategies for DCAA; these appear at the end of this study as 
Appendix D. 
While the DCAA and DCMA workforce is capable and well-managed, drastic cuts 
initiated in the early and mid-1990s have gutted the capacity for DCAA to and DCMA to 
perform their mission and functions.  
Within the past five years, many academics, senior DoD personnel, and 
prominent policy makers have called for increased managerial and oversight 
capabilities.  These may be in response to well-founded criticisms of the reform-
initiative-driven reduction of oversight capabilities and management capacities needed 
for Federal acquisitions.  Most notably, Stephen Schooner, Associate Professor of Law, 
George Washington University Law School, is very critical of reforms that espouse 
acquisition reforms with reduced oversight and management stemming from a reduction 
of statutes and regulations originally designed to protect the taxpayer.33 
                                            
29 The DOD Regulatory Cost Premium: A Quantitative Assessment, Coopers & Lybrand/TASC, Inc., 
December 1994. 
30 GAO/NSIAD-96-106: General Accounting Office, April 1996. 
31 GAO/NSIAD-97-48: General Accounting Office, January 1997. 
32 GAO/NSAID-98-127: General Accounting Office, July 1998. 
33 Steven L. Schooner, Associate Professor of Law, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of 
Businesslike Government, George Washington University of Law, 2001. 
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Additionally, as opposed to its mid-1990s focus on downsizing the acquisition 
system, the General Accounting Office has recently called for a re-thinking of the force 
structure.  In April 2002, GAO recognized the negative effects of the prior decade’s 
mass reduction of acquisition workforce; it, therefore, called for a fundamental 
restructuring of the civilian acquisition workforce to foster new applicants, create 
sustainable force levels, and deal with an existing gutted force of which nearly 50% is 
eligible for civil service retirement.34 
A year later, in March 2003, in response to Congressional concerns about the 
quantity and quality of the civilian workforce, GAO called for a strategic planning for 
workforce requirements, including that of the acquisition workforce; “something,” they 
contend, was absent from current management initiatives.35 
Once again, in a June 2004 report, GAO studied the more than $20 billion spent 
since April 2003 to support rebuilding efforts in Iraq.  The report highlighted the 
challenges facing acquisition personnel in the award and administration (management) 
of nearly one-hundred contracts and task orders.   The GAO findings included clear 
identification of a lack of personnel resources to effectively conduct the pre- and post-
award activities essential to ensure adequate oversight and management.  In a DoD 
Inspector General report dated March 2004, GAO cites that, “overall, Government 
personnel did not provide adequate surveillance on 13 of the 24 contracts” examined.36   
The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DODIG) 
issued an audit report in February 2000 entitled, DOD Acquisition Workforce Reduction 
Trends and Impacts, in which several critical and negative impacts of acquisition 
workforce reductions are identified, including: 
 
                                            
34 GAO-02-630: General Accounting Office, April 2002. 
35 GAO-03-475: General Accounting Office, March 2003. 
36 GAO-04-605: General Accounting Office, June 2004.  
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• Increased backlog in closing out completed contracts 
• Increased program costs resulting from contracting for technical support vice using 
in-house (organic) resources 
• Insufficient personnel to fill-in for employees on deployment 
• Insufficient staff to manage requirements 
• Reduced scrutiny and timeliness in reviewing acquisition actions 
• Personnel retention difficulties 
• Increased procurement action lead time (PALT) 
• Skill imbalances 
• Lost opportunities to develop cost/savings initiatives 
The DODIG report was keen to point out that without changes to the structural 
force, continued and lasting problems in oversight and management will likely result,37 
potentially exposing the Government and its taxpayers to unacceptable levels of risk.    
                                            
37 Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense (DODIG), Report Number D-2000-088, 
February 29, 2000.  
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Engagement and Disengagement: Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
Acquisition reform initiatives, born from the necessities emanating from changing 
market dynamics, and desired efficiencies and effectiveness of Government operations 
originally proposed under the National Performance Review (NPR), have taken strong 
root from legislation such as FASA and FARA.  The push for reform is not over.  
Additional legislation, not specifically the topic of this work, have either been passed, or 
are in process, for example: the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) passed in 
early 2004.  SARA called for, among many of its provisions, a further use of 
commercially-based processes.  Later, Congressman Tom Davis, Chairman of the 
House Government Reform Committee, introduced a bill in May 2004, known as the 
Acquisition System Improvement Act (ASIA).  The ASIA legislation calls for the 
authorization of share-in-savings contracts, wherein contractors are “rewarded” for 
creating savings to existing processes and systems.  Clearly to the decade-long push 
towards greater reform is not likely to be reversed in the upcoming years. 
The 1980’s experienced a tightening of oversight and management 
(engagement) based on system abuses of contractors and acquisition personnel alike.  
The 1990’s, in response to the end of the Cold War, a call for a ‘peace dividend’ and 
innovative thinking in acquisition reforms resulted in a loosening of oversight and 
management and concurrent reductions in the acquisition workforce (disengagement) 
dedicated to performing those functions.   
The researcher contends that reform initiatives have improved operations.  But 
faults in the application of FASA and FARA, combined with personnel reductions, have 
created too large a void in managerial and oversight capabilities within the DoD.  
Commercialization is here to stay, and rightfully so.  Policy makers and practitioners 
need to understand the risks in the commercialized and downsized environment. 
The researcher, although critical of the impacts that disengagement has on 
oversight and management, and the associated financial and managerial risks the 
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Government assumes, does not believe the reforms lack merit.  The reforms have, to a 
large extent, given the Federal Government the capability to do more with less, and to 
capitalize on private industries’ ability to provide goods and services in response to 
Government needs.   
Notwithstanding, there are several recommendations that the researcher 
proposes to ensure sound and efficient management and oversight, and to execute 
sound business practices aimed at garnering maximum efficiency and effectiveness of 
operations. Hence, in order to bring management and oversight back to a reasonable 
balance between full-engagement versus extreme disengagement, the following 
recommendations are proposed: 
Recommendation 1:  Eliminate the FASA and FARA provision allowing 
contractors to assert commercial item status on goods or services when contractors 
cannot provide evidence of substantial sales to the general public, or sales in sufficient 
quantities to Government agencies.  The condition for contractors to demonstrate a 
track record of business-to-business and/or business-to-Government sales, as a 
condition to cite commercial-item status, will ensure the competitive-market forces and 
market-pricing pressures drive the prices being offered for the instant contract.   
Recommendation 2:  Increase the civilian personnel at DCAA and 
DCMA—through statutory authority and appropriation—to levels commensurate with the 
scope of duties prescribed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. DCAA and DCMA 
civilian personnel structural cuts have decimated their ability to effectively and efficiently 
manage and oversee DoD contracting and acquisitions; this is despite innovating and 
aggressive efforts by their management to transform business operations to deal with 
the cuts.  Increasing the number of people, effectively creating a personnel-based force 
multiplier, will allow for better coverage of the hundreds of thousands of contract actions 
under their administrative and audit authority.   
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Recommendation 3:  Increase funding for graduate education 
opportunities for the civilian acquisition workforce beyond the basic provisions of 
DAWIA.   Author and pass specific legislation that authorizes and appropriates money 
earmarked for Agency graduate-level education.  This will allow for acquisition 
professionals to progress in the dynamic and ever-challenging acquisition career field, 
will increase the skills and capabilities of a finite workforce, and will foster attraction and 
retention of motivated personnel to Government acquisition positions.   
Recommendation 4:  Assign key acquisition personnel as liaison to the 
Congressional Reform Committee to serve as stakeholder representative in the 
formulation and efficacy reviewer stages of acquisition reform legislation.  
While these recommendations are specifically proposed to address the problems 
in reform initiatives and structural changes contained within this work, they will go far to 
protect the interests of the taxpayer over the long-term by re-thinking commercial-item 
legislation and optimizing the force structure required to effectively and efficiently 
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Appendix A:  
Top Ten Cost Drivers Identified by Coopers and Lybrand 
 
Source:  GAO/NSAID-96-106; Acquisition Reform: Efforts to Reduce the Cost to Manage and Oversee 
DOD Contracts, April 1996. 
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Appendix B. 
FAR Part 12 Provisions for Statutory Relief for Commercial Items. 
12.503 Applicability of certain laws to Executive agency contracts for the 
acquisition of commercial items.  
(a) The following laws are not applicable to Executive agency contracts for the 
acquisition of commercial items:  
(1) 41 U.S.C. 43, Walsh-Healey Act (see Subpart 22.6).  
(2) 41 U.S.C. 254(a) and 10 U.S.C. 2306(b), Contingent Fees (see 3.404).  
(3) 41 U.S.C. 416(a)(6), Minimum Response Time for Offers under Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy Act (see 5.203).  
(4) 41 U.S.C. 701, et seq., Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (see 23.501).  
(5) 31 U.S.C. 1354(a), Limitation on use of appropriated funds for contracts with 
entities not meeting veterans' employment reporting requirements (see 22.1302).  
(b) Certain requirements of the following laws are not applicable to executive agency 
contracts for the acquisition of commercial items:  
(1) 40 U.S.C. 327 et seq., Requirement for a certificate and clause under the 
Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (see 22.305).  
(2) 41 U.S.C. 57(a) and (b), and 58, Requirement for a clause and certain other 
requirements related to the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 (see 3.502).  
(3) 49 U.S.C. 40118, Requirement for a clause under the Fly American 
provisions (see 47.405).  
(c) The applicability of the following laws has been modified in regards to Executive 
agency contracts for the acquisition of commercial items:  
(1) 41 U.S.C. 253g and 10 U.S.C. 2402, Prohibition on Limiting Subcontractor 
Direct Sales to the United States (see 3.503).  
(2) 41 U.S.C. 254(d) and 10 U.S.C. 2306a, Truth in Negotiations Act (see 
15.403).  
(3) 41 U.S.C. 422, Cost Accounting Standards (48 CFR chapter 99) (see 
12.214).  
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 32- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
12.504 Applicability of certain laws to subcontracts for the acquisition of 
commercial items.  
(a) The following laws are not applicable to subcontracts at any tier for the acquisition of 
commercial items or commercial components at any tier:  
(1) 10 U.S.C. 2631, Transportation of Supplies by Sea (except for the types of 
subcontracts listed at 47.504(d)).  
(2) 15 U.S.C. 644(d), Requirements relative to labor surplus areas under the 
Small Business Act (see Subpart 19.2).  
(3) 31 U.S.C. 1352, Limitation on Payments to Influence Certain Federal 
Transactions (see Subpart 3.8).  
(4) 41 U.S.C. 43, Walsh-Healey Act (see Subpart 22.6).  
(5) 41 U.S.C. 253(d), Validation of Proprietary Data Restrictions (see Subpart 
27.4).  
(6) 41 U.S.C. 254(a) and 10 U.S.C. 2306(b), Contingent Fees (see Subpart 3.4).  
(7) 41 U.S.C. 254(c) and 10 U.S.C. 2313(c), Examination of Records of 
Contractor, when a subcontractor is not required to provide cost or pricing data 
(see 15.209(b)).  
(8) 41 U.S.C. 416(a)(6), Minimum Response Time for Offers under Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy Act (see Subpart 5.2).  
(9) 41 U.S.C. 418(a), Rights in Technical Data (see Subpart 27.4).  
(10) 41 U.S.C. 701, et seq., Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (see Subpart 
23.5).  
(11) 46 U.S.C. Appx 1241(b), Transportation in American Vessels of Government 
Personnel and Certain Cargo (see Subpart 47.5) (except for the types of 
subcontracts listed at 47.504(d)).  
(12) 49 U.S.C. 40118, Fly American provisions (see Subpart 47.4).  
(b) The requirements for a certificate and clause under the Contract Work Hours and 
Safety Standards Act, 40 U.S.C. 327, et seq., (see Subpart 22.3) are not applicable to 
subcontracts at any tier for the acquisition of commercial items or commercial 
components.  
(c) The applicability of the following laws has been modified in regards to subcontracts 
at any tier for the acquisition of commercial items or commercial components:  
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(1) 41 U.S.C. 253(g) and 10 U.S.C. 2402, Prohibition on Limiting Subcontractor 
Direct Sales to the United States (see Subpart 3.5).  
(2) 41 U.S.C. 254(d) and 10 U.S.C. 2306(a), Truth in Negotiations Act (see 
Subpart 15.4).  
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Appendix C. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 42.0 defining DCMA 
functions. 
When a contract is assigned for administration under Subpart 42.2, the contract 
administration office (CAO) shall perform contract administration functions in 
accordance with 48 CFR Chapter 1, the contract terms, and, unless otherwise agreed to 
in an interagency agreement (see 42.002), the applicable regulations of the servicing 
agency.  
42.302 Contract administration functions.  
(a) The contracting officer normally delegates the following contract administration 
functions to a CAO. The contracting officer may retain any of these functions, except 
those in paragraphs (a)(5), (a)(9), and (a)(11) of this section, unless the cognizant 
Federal agency (see 2.101) has designated the contracting officer to perform these 
functions.  
(1) Review the contractor's compensation structure.  
(2) Review the contractor's insurance plans.  
(3) Conduct post-award orientation conferences.  
(4) Review and evaluate contractors' proposals under Subpart 15.4 and, when 
negotiation will be accomplished by the contracting officer, furnish comments and 
recommendations to that officer.  
(5) Negotiate forward pricing rate agreements (see 15.407-3).  
(6) Negotiate advance agreements applicable to treatment of costs under 
contracts currently assigned for administration (see 31.109).  
(7) Determine the allowability of costs suspended or disapproved as required 
(see Subpart 42.8); direct the suspension or disapproval of costs when there is 
reason to believe they should be suspended or disapproved; and approve final 
vouchers.  
(8) Issue Notices of Intent to Disallow or not Recognize Costs (see Subpart 
42.8).  
(9) Establish final indirect cost rates and billing rates for those contractors 
meeting the criteria for contracting officer determination in Subpart 42.7.  
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(10) Attempt to resolve issues in controversy, using ADR procedures when 
appropriate (see Subpart 33.2); prepare findings of fact and issue decisions 
under the Disputes clause on matters in which the administrative contracting 
officer (ACO) has the authority to take definitive action.  
(11) In connection with Cost Accounting Standards (see 30.601 and 48 CFR 
Chapter 99 (FAR Appendix)):.  
(i) Determine the adequacy of the contractor's disclosure statements;  
(ii) Determine whether disclosure statements are in compliance with Cost 
Accounting Standards and Part 31;  
(iii) Determine the contractor's compliance with Cost Accounting 
Standards and disclosure statements, if applicable; and  
(iv) Negotiate price adjustments and execute supplemental agreements 
under the Cost Accounting Standards clauses at 52.230-2, 52.230-3, 
52.230-4, 52.230-5, and 52.230-6.  
(12) Review and approve or disapprove the contractor's requests for payments 
under the progress payments or performance-based payments clauses.  
(13) Make payments on assigned contracts when prescribed in agency 
acquisition regulations.  
(14) Manage special bank accounts.  
(15) Ensure timely notification by the contractor of any anticipated overrun or 
under run of the estimated cost under cost-reimbursement contracts.  
(16) Monitor the contractor's financial condition and advise the contracting officer 
when it jeopardizes contract performance.  
(17) Analyze quarterly limitation on payments statements and recover 
overpayments from the contractor.  
(18) Issue tax exemption forms.  
(19) Ensure processing and execution of duty-free entry certificates.  
(20) For classified contracts, administer those portions of the applicable industrial 
security program delegated to the CAO (see Subpart 4.4).  
(21) Issue work requests under maintenance, overhaul, and modification 
contracts.  
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(22) Negotiate prices and execute supplemental agreements for spare parts and 
other items selected through provisioning procedures when prescribed by agency 
acquisition regulations.  
(23) Negotiate and execute contractual documents for settlement of partial and 
complete contract terminations for convenience, except as otherwise prescribed 
by Part 49.  
(24) Negotiate and execute contractual documents settling cancellation charges 
under multiyear contracts.  
(25) Process and execute notation of change of name agreements under Subpart 
42.12.  
(26) Perform property administration (see Part 45).  
(27) Approve contractor acquisition or fabrication of special test equipment under 
the clause at 52.245-18, Special Test Equipment.  
(28) Perform necessary screening, redistribution, and disposal of contractor 
inventory.  
(29) Issue contract modifications requiring the contractor to provide packing, 
crating, and handling services on excess Government property. When the ACO 
determines it to be in the Government's interests, the services may be secured 
from a contractor other than the contractor in possession of the property.  
(30) In facilities contracts-  
(i) Evaluate the contractor's requests for facilities and for changes to 
existing facilities and provide appropriate recommendations to the 
contracting officer;  
(ii) Ensure required screening of facility items before acquisition by the 
contractor;  
(iii) Approve use of facilities on a noninterference basis in accordance with 
the clause at 52.245-9, Use and Charges;  
(iv) Ensure payment by the contractor of any rental due; and  
(v) Ensure reporting of items no longer needed for Government 
production.  
(31) Perform production support, surveillance, and status reporting, including 
timely reporting of potential and actual slippages in contract delivery schedules.  
(32) Perform pre-award surveys (see Subpart 9.1).  
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(33) Advise and assist contractors regarding their priorities and allocations 
responsibilities and assist contracting offices in processing requests for special 
assistance and for priority ratings for privately-owned capital equipment.  
(34) Monitor contractor industrial labor relations matters under the contract; 
apprise the contracting officer and, if designated by the agency, the cognizant 
labor relations advisor, of actual or potential labor disputes; and coordinate the 
removal of urgently-required material from the strikebound contractor's plant 
upon instruction from, and authorization of, the contracting officer.  
(35) Perform traffic-management services, including issuance and control of 
Government bills of lading and other transportation documents.  
(36) Review the adequacy of the contractor's traffic operations.  
(37) Review and evaluate preservation, packaging, and packing.  
(38) Ensure contractor compliance with contractual quality assurance 
requirements (see Part 46).  
(39) Ensure contractor compliance with contractual safety requirements.  
(40) Perform engineering surveillance to assess compliance with contractual 
terms for schedule, cost, and technical performance in the areas of design, 
development, and production.  
(41) Evaluate for adequacy and perform surveillance of contractor engineering 
efforts and management systems that relate to design, development, production, 
engineering changes, subcontractors, tests, management of engineering 
resources, reliability and maintainability, data control systems, configuration 
management, and independent research and development.  
(42) Review and evaluate for technical adequacy the contractor's logistics 
support, maintenance, and modification programs.  
(43) Report to the contracting office any inadequacies noted in specifications.  
(44) Perform engineering analyses of contractor cost proposals.  
(45) Review and analyze contractor-proposed engineering and design studies 
and submit comments and recommendations to the contracting office as 
required.  
(46) Review engineering change proposals for proper classification, and when 
required, for need, technical adequacy of design, producibility, and impact on 
quality, reliability, schedule, and cost; submit comments to the contracting office.  
(47) Assist in evaluating and make recommendations for acceptance or rejection 
of waivers and deviations.  
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(48) Evaluate and monitor the contractor's procedures for complying with 
procedures regarding restrictive markings on data.  
(49) Monitor the contractor's value engineering program.  
(50) Review, approve or disapprove, and maintain surveillance of the contractor's 
purchasing system (see Part 44).  
(51) Consent to the placement of subcontracts.  
(52) Review, evaluate, and approve plant or division-wide small, small 
disadvantaged and women-owned small business master subcontracting plans.  
(53) Obtain the contractor's currently approved company- or division-wide plans 
for small, small disadvantaged and women-owned small business subcontracting 
for its commercial products, or, if there is no currently approved plan, assist the 
contracting officer in evaluating the plans for those products.  
(54) Assist the contracting officer, upon request, in evaluating an offeror's 
proposed small, small disadvantaged and women-owned small business 
subcontracting plans, including documentation of compliance with similar plans 
under prior contracts.  
(55) By periodic surveillance, ensure the contractor's compliance with small, 
small disadvantaged and women-owned small business subcontracting plans 
and any labor surplus area contractual requirements; maintain documentation of 
the contractor's performance under and compliance with these plans and 
requirements; and provide advice and assistance to the firms involved as 
appropriate.  
(56) Maintain surveillance of flight operations.  
(57) Assign and perform supporting contract administration.  
(58) Ensure timely submission of required reports.  
(59) Issue administrative changes, correcting errors or omissions in typing, 
contractor address, facility or activity code, remittance address, computations 
which do not require additional contract funds, and other such changes (see 
43.101).  
(60) Cause release of shipments from contractor's plants according to the 
shipping instructions. When applicable, the order of assigned priority shall be 
followed; shipments within the same priority shall be determined by date of the 
instruction.  
(61) Obtain contractor proposals for any contract price adjustments resulting from 
amended shipping instructions. Review all amended shipping instructions on a 
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periodic, consolidated basis to ensure that adjustments are timely made. Except 
when the ACO has settlement authority, the ACO shall forward the proposal to 
the contracting officer for contract modification. The ACO shall not delay 
shipments pending completion and formalization of negotiations of revised 
shipping instructions.  
(62) Negotiate and/or execute supplemental agreements, as required, making 
changes in packaging subcontractors or contract shipping points.  
(63) Cancel unilateral purchase orders when notified of non-acceptance by the 
contractor. The CAO shall notify the contracting officer when the purchase order 
is canceled.  
(64) Negotiate and execute one-time supplemental agreements providing for the 
extension of contract delivery schedules up to 90 days on contracts with an 
assigned Criticality Designator of C (see 42.1105). Notification that the contract 
delivery schedule is being extended shall be provided to the contracting office. 
Subsequent extensions on any individual contract shall be authorized only upon 
concurrence of the contracting office.  
(65) Accomplish administrative closeout procedures (see 4.804-5).  
(66) Determine that the contractor has a drug-free workplace program and drug-
free awareness program (see Subpart 23.5).  
(67) Support the program, product, and project offices regarding program 
reviews, program status, program performance and actual or anticipated program 
problems.  
(68) Monitor the contractor's environmental practices for adverse impact on 
contract performance or contract cost, and for compliance with environmental 
requirements specified in the contract. ACO responsibilities include-  
(i) Requesting environmental technical assistance, if needed;  
(ii) Monitoring contractor compliance with specifications requiring the use 
of environmentally preferable products, energy-efficient products, and 
materials or delivery of end products with specified recovered material 
content. This must occur as part of the quality assurance procedures set 
forth in Part 46; and  
(iii) As required in the contract, ensuring that the contractor complies with 
the reporting requirements relating to recovered material content utilized in 
contract performance (see Subpart 23.4).  
(69) Administer commercial financing provisions and monitor contractor security 
to ensure its continued adequacy to cover outstanding payments, when on-site 
review is required.  
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(70) Deobligate excess funds after final price determination.  
(b) The CAO shall perform the following functions only when and to the extent 
specifically authorized by the contracting office:  
(1) Negotiate or negotiate and execute supplemental agreements incorporating 
contractor proposals resulting from change orders issued under the Changes 
clause. Before completing negotiations, coordinate any delivery schedule change 
with the contracting office.  
(2) Negotiate prices and execute priced exhibits for unpriced orders issued by the 
contracting officer under basic ordering agreements.  
(3) Negotiate or negotiate and execute supplemental agreements changing 
contract delivery schedules.  
(4) Negotiate or negotiate and execute supplemental agreements providing for 
the deobligation of unexpended dollar balances considered excess to known 
contract requirements.  
(5) Issue amended shipping instructions and, when necessary, negotiate and 
execute supplemental agreements incorporating contractor proposals resulting 
from these instructions.  
(6) Negotiate changes to interim billing prices.  
(7) Negotiate and definitize adjustments to contract prices resulting from exercise 
of an economic price adjustment clause (see Subpart 16.2).  
(8) Issue change orders and negotiate and execute resulting supplemental 
agreements under contracts for ship construction, conversion, and repair.  
(9) Execute supplemental agreements on firm-fixed-price supply contracts to 
reduce required contract line item quantities and deobligate excess funds when 
notified by the contractor of an inconsequential delivery shortage, and it is 
determined that such action is in the best interests of the Government, 
notwithstanding the default provisions of the contract. Such action will be taken 
only upon the written request of the contractor and, in no event, shall the total 
downward contract price adjustment resulting from an inconsequential delivery 
shortage exceed $250.00 or 5 percent of the contract price, whichever is less.  
(10) Execute supplemental agreements to permit a change in place of inspection 
at origin specified in firm-fixed-price supply contracts awarded to non-
manufacturers, as deemed necessary to protect the Government's interests.  
(11) Prepare evaluations of contractor performance in accordance with Subpart 
42.15.  
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(c) Any additional contract administration functions not listed in 42.302(a) and (b), or not 
otherwise delegated, remain the responsibility of the contracting office.  
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 42- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Appendix D. 
Excerpts from GAO Report on DCAA and DCMA Workforce 
Reductions and Oversight (GAO/NSAID-98-127) 38 
 
                                            
38 GAO Report GOA/NSIAD-98-127, “Acquisition Management—Workforce Reductions and Contractor 
Oversight, General Accounting Office, July 1998. 
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